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1 Introduction
One of the main reasons for the sustained activity and interest in the field of agent-based systems,
apart from the obvious recognition of its value as a natural and intuitive way of understanding the
world, is its reach into very many dierent and distinct fields of investigation. Indeed, the notions of
agents and multi-agent systems are relevant to fields ranging from economics to robotics, in
contributing to the foundations of the field, being influenced by ongoing research, and in providing
many domains of application. While these various disciplines constitute a rich and diverse
environment for agent research, the way in which they may have been linked by it is a much less
considered issue. The purpose of this panel was to examine just this concern, in the relationships
between dierent areas that have resulted from agent research. Informed by the experience of the
participants in the areas of robotics, social simulation, economics, computer science and artificial
intelligence, the discussion was lively and sometimes heated.
2 Embodiment
Does embodiment matter in agent research? If it does, how?
Agent embodiment is regarded by Doran as referring, in eect, to the level of complexity,
unpredictability, unrepeatability and error in the processes of sensing and action available to an
agent. If the level of embodiment in this sense is relatively high, and in particular, if it goes beyond
that naturally captured in the agent’s internal representations, then the agent is embodied.
Embodiment is very important, for in its presence the chance of a mismatch between an agent’s
representations and the reality is high and the agent’s task of correctly linking action to perception
becomes much harder.
In robotics research, the importance of embodiment is both clear and very visible. Trivially, what
a robot can do is determined by its bodily form. For example, no legs implies no walking, and no x
sensor implies no perception of x. However, it matters for more subtle reasons too. If a robot is
driven by emergent behaviour, then exactly what emerges depends upon the whole interaction
between robot and environment; not just the software, but how much the wheels slip, where the
sensors are on the body, how well-charged the robot is, and many other things.
In particular, the behaviour of groups of agents may be profoundly aected by the fact that while
they may all run the same software, everything else about them is slightly dierent. No two sensors
perform in exactly the same way, no two sets of wheels slip by the same amount, no two robots are
equally charged. Where agents are using stigmergy—communication via the environment—their
dierences are a source of variation in the environment for each other. Thus, while it might be
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thought that Aylett’s two Salford robots, Fred and Ginger (Barnes et al., 1997), might approach an
obstacle exactly head-on and try to avoid it by turning in opposite directions, with disastrous results,
this has never actually been observed. Small dierences mean that one of them is always slightly
ahead and pulls the other around the obstacle.
Pragmatically, (pseudo) embodiment matters in order to use body language as an additional
channel of communication. Thus various virtual agents use gesture, facial expression and stance to
communicate emotional state or attentiveness (for example, direction of glance indicates attentional
focus). Doing this in robotics is more problematic, because displaying body language with a typical
robot body is hard, and noticing it with typical robot sensors is even harder. However, it is quicker
to assume cooperation if an agent moves towards an object to be transported than it is to explicitly
negotiate. Humans use inference based on body movement at least as much as explicit communica-
tion when it comes to physical cooperation.
Is embodiment a specific property of natural or physical agents (e.g., animals, robots), or is it a
universal property (e.g., of agent-environment couplings) that can be formalised beyond the concrete
physical or software implementation?
If we start from the premise that agency arises from biology, living things have agency but rocks and
stars do not. Thus, in a sense, agent research transfers intuitions from nature. Indeed, much agent
research assumes a model of autonomous reflective reasoning and human-based mind-body split
that is suciently abstract for logic rather than biological process to be its target representation.
Conversely, the behavioural approach to robotics, and the whole enterprise of artificial life, might
be said to reflect a model of agency in which coupling to the environment and emergent behaviour
are seen as the important features and ants are just as much agents as humans. Taking this
environmental coupling as a starting point, process rather than object then becomes the organising
principle, and a body (as well as mind) can be seen as the temporal propagation of a pattern rather
than something static. However, if everything is process, abstracting mind away from body is
incongruous with the necessary entwining of processes of body and mind.
Additionally, if emergent behaviour is the focus, then bodily interaction is the source of this
emergence rather than a set of software instructions directly mapping to body movements. Indeed,
mind may itself be an emergent behaviour. We think intuitively of body as something solid—a
physical boundary with an autonomous inside and other agents and processes not controlled by the
agent outside. This notion of a static body is rather misleading, however, and clearly so in the case of
biological agents; not one cell in an adult human body was present when the human was born and
only a continuing process maintains it as a body. It therefore seems preferable to regard a body as a
set of processes, but only if the claim of any multi-threaded piece of software to thereby have a body
can be excluded. In this process sense, robot bodies are extremely primitive and disconnected—while
they are full of processes (such as oxidation and electric current), many of these are independent of
the software running on them. Robots have no immune system and a very impoverished coupling to
the real world when compared to even very simple living organisms.
Distinct from the concept of physical boundary, the ability to move is also important. Bodies
consist of elements that can both be moved under autonomous control and support movement of
the agent in its environment. This is also somewhat problematic, if only because while we may not
think of plants as having bodies in the same sense as animals, it is hard to deny that they are in some
sense embodied. Do we necessarily accept that mobile agents (in the Internet sense) must have
bodies because they are mobile? Do we accept that an intelligent process plant, constructed as an
agent, cannot be embodied because it does not move around?
Even if we take embodiment to be something that actually happens only in the real physical
world, we might still see some agent work as concerned with modelling embodiment, and some not.
Many software agent systems seem to perform little perception apart from receiving messages from
other agents and no actuation to change the environment. They communicate at a symbolic level
with others rather than observing them; they agree to carry out tasks but seem to get little feedback
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from doing so. It is not always clear what their execution mechanism actually is, and the focus is on
deciding to act rather than on acting. This could be problematic if it allows us to produce multi-
agent systems without considering the dynamics of their activity (as it might with multi-agent
financial systems).
There is also an intuitive dierence between a virtual agent, with a modelled body and virtual
sensors and actuators, and a software agent working at a purely symbolic level. Several virtual agent
researchers specifically study gesture, body language and facial expression as a means of commu-
nication. Indeed, embodiment concerns some aspect of an agent that is continuously observable by
other agents from the outside. This supports inferences about the internal state of an agent and
assumptions about its capabilities as well as predictions about its immediate behaviour. It also
supports many kinds of inter-agent interaction: a body can allow an agent to be recognised as ‘one
of us’, ‘my friend and colleague’, ‘something good to eat’, or ‘something that might eat me’.
The question of whether embodiment is a universal property is best answered with reference to the
definition provided earlier. In that sense, it is a potentially universal property in that an agent in any
domain or of any type may be embodied, but embodiment is likely to be a more important issue in
some domains (such as robotics) than others. Indeed, if embodiment is physically contingent then it
may have to be located within concrete physical systems if one is to say anything interesting about it.
Models of embodiment may be interesting research tools and may help us to build more useful agent
systems, but may not themselves be embodiment. Virtual rain does not get anyone wet.
Do you think that agent models and theories can be transferred between dierent kinds of agents like
virtual, robotic, software, or animal agents (e.g., ethological models on animal behaviour)? Do you
know examples of such attempts? How do you see the applicability and limitations of such an approach
in your specific area of agent research?
Here, the panelists oered a range of responses. Doran argues that the range of possible core
structures of agents (that is, the architecture of the agent within its embodiment, if any) are common
over all agent (application) domains (Doran, 1996). For example, there is no substantial dierence
in the core agent structures that seem to be available in mobile robotics, intelligent buildings, social
simulation, and network management, although terminology is to some extent divergent.
Similarly, Aylett suggests that as above, everything in this field is based on varying analogies from
nature. Much interesting work in robotics tries to reapply what is known about ants, bees, crickets,
slugs, cockroaches and other insects. Aylett’s work on cooperative robots at Salford started from
social insects and not from humans, looking for ways in which cooperation could be produced as an
emergent behaviour from physical interaction rather than as an explicit result of reasoning. Here,
cooperation was bodily activity rather than a mental one.
There is no reason why the same ideas and models cannot be reapplied to virtual agents
(specifically agents in virtual environment) and to other software agents. Much artificial life work
uses simulation as, for example, the Santa Fe Trail (a well-known ant model) and prey-predator
simulations, to explore models based on the natural world. In particular, much work in synthetic or
virtual agents reuses robotic models, as in the application of the Salford behavioural robot
architecture to virtual Teletubbies (Aylett et al., 1999), for example. Similarly, the JACK project
consciously reapplies a typical three-layer robotic architecture to the animation of a biomechanical
model of the human body. Many other robotic architectures (such as Firby’s RAP) have also been
reapplied. It is easier to reapply robot models to virtual agents—as compared to other software
agents—since the environments in which they are located are themselves (fairly crude) models of the
real world in most cases. In fact, because of the limitations of engineering and cost, it is actually
possible to model more sophisticated agent-environment couplings in virtual worlds than robots
achieve in the real one—at least from the agent side. For example, the system of chemical emitters
and receptors used in the games software Creatures is well ahead of any robot implementation.
The down side of this is that while it is easier to model the agent, it is harder to deal with the
environment to which it is coupled. This is because in the real-world physics just is, while in a virtual
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world, physics must be added explicitly. Virtual worlds have a tendency not only to be impoverished
but to be uniform, because this is the easiest thing to do. If robotics often provides rudimentary
agents in an interesting world, virtual agents can be seen as providing interesting agents in a
rudimentary world.
A more reserved assessment was made by Moss, who recast the original question to ask whether
and under what conditions such a representation of agents and agent cognition can be transferred
from social simulation models to useful systems in robotics, information search and process control.
He illustrates the discussion with the example of his work with Schroeder at City University to
develop specifications of software agents so that they can autonomously develop trading procedures
and practices as well as contacts for buying from and selling to other information agents. The idea is
that trading arrangements, practices, norms etc.—what most of us would call markets—will emerge
from the activities of the software agents. The emergence is important because we know that, in the
real world, the characteristics of markets (i.e., the trading arrangements, norms, etc.) dier for
dierent commodities. Ships are simply not sold in the same way that cars or chocolate bars or even
boats are sold. Arguably, the dierences in the ways that dierent commodities are traded depends
upon their physical characteristics and the technology involved in eecting transactions.
Now some people working in MAS and, in particular, on information agents, simply adopt
approaches to agents and markets taken from economics. This is a curious approach since
economists do not themselves argue that their representations of agents are descriptively accurate
and they do not analyse the process of exchange. The more promising approach is to start with
historically accurate descriptions of the emergence of various trading practices, norms, etc., taking
account of the relevant technologies involved. Then we can reason about the ways in which the
historical experience can apply to information markets where autonomous software agents trade.
That process of reasoning is suitably conducted within the framework of social simulation
modelling.
As a second example, Moss describes work with Dautenhahn on the use of organizational
structures to control robot teams engaged in certain types of activities (Moss and Dautenhahn,
1998). The control mechanisms are specified on the basis of models of real organisations though
they are by no means straightforward copies. The dierences in the models of organisations of real
people and the organisation of simulated robot teams result from reasoning about the dierences in
the problem domains. A further step would be to test the simulations on actual robots.
In a similar vein, Tennenholtz argues that while basic ideas from one area can be borrowed by
another, as was demonstrated by his work on artificial social systems (and its application to
robotics) and on protocols for non-cooperative agents (and its application to electronic commerce),
in many cases, these ideas may lead to approaches that are vastly dierent from the ones used in the
original domain. For example, social laws in robotics are usually quite dierent from the ones used
in human activity, while models of protocols for non-cooperative agents applied to electronic
commerce deviate from the classical economic assumptions from which they were derived.
3 Interdisciplinarity
Is it possible and/or desirable, and/or necessary to transfer models and theories between dierent areas,
like social science, anthropology, MAS, robotics, etc? How do you see dierences in goals and
objectives of agent research in these dierent fields? (Are we talking the same language?)
Human sciences can tell us much about the constraints under which humans act, and it seems silly to
ignore this knowledge. Anthropology seems particularly relevant in that it looks at the links between
the behaviour of individuals and the behaviour of the whole society for a variety of dierent
cultures. It is also extremely important—to the point of necessity—to be aware of biological models
and concepts and how they can be reapplied in computer-based agents of various kinds. Complex-
ity, the current state of biological understanding, and computational resource seem to be some of
the main problems in doing this.
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Other disciplines that should be mentioned are psychology and the arts. Psychology is another
field from which useful models can be garnered, with the same proviso as with social sciences, that
psychological models sometimes have a rather tenuous link with empirical psychology. Work in
synthetic agents is heavily influenced by work in psychology on emotion and behavioural
interaction, for example. Artistic theory is also being reapplied, particularly from the theatre and
drama, where issues of role playing, improvisation and believability, as well as narrative coherence
have all been taken up in work on synthetic, or virtual, agents.
In all these cases, there is every chance that we are all speaking dierent languages—using
dierent terms to mean similar things or the same terms to mean quite dierent things. This seems to
be all part of the fun, however, and will resolve itself as long as people keep talking to each other.
Clearly, transferring models and theories is both possible and desirable. However, as Doran
points out, pure theories of core agent architecture and of multi-agent systems (analogous to pure
mathematics) can be distinguished from their application in some particular application domain
(analogous to a piece of pure mathematics finding an application). In considering the applicability
of models and theories in dierent domains, therefore, we can distinguish between attempts to
develop new pure theories of agent systems, attempts to engineer eective agent systems for
particular tasks such as network management, and attempts to use agent systems to model social
systems, for example, to learn about the latter. The relevance from each of these concerns may be
more or less applicable in other areas.
Indeed, theories cannot always be simply transformed from one area to another area; they must
be carefully reconstructed, and require significant familiarity with related theories. For example,
many problems in electronic commerce are some mixture of economics and computer science
questions, but require a deep understanding of related theories before they can be eectively
modified. Finding general solutions that can be transferred across domains may not be a simple
process.
In transferring models, it is important to be aware of the dierent levels on which they work.
Robots and virtual agents must cope with physical movement in a spatial world. The problems and
issues faced here may operate at a dierent level to macro social science, where it is still controversial
how complex the model of an individual agent really needs to be. One should also be aware of what
assumptions are encoded in a social science model—for example, economic models frequently
assume rational individualism. Finally, one should be aware that social science models are not
always firmly connected to empirical social science—it is for that very reason that the use of
computing can help social science theorists, since it animates the models and demonstrates their
empirical consequences.
According to Moss, this kind of experience indicates clearly that models of agents can be
transferred among the various MAS disciplines. Whether it is useful depends upon the models being
transferred and why. The fundamental issue seems to be less about transferring models than
transferring the understanding and experience that led to the formulation of those models. If we
have learned about markets in the real world and why dierent markets entail dierent arrange-
ments for determining supplies, prices, demands and the characteristics of what is being traded, then
that understanding should help us to reason about the characteristics of systems that will allow
information, or other, markets to emerge.
We can also learn about analogous relationships in (say) information markets or robot control
systems, etc., and use that additional understanding in our analyses of social systems. Moss believes
that, in all such cases, good science involves clear specifications of the conditions in which a model
or representation of agents is applicable and the class of results from using that model or
specification that will confirm the appropriateness of that model or specification or, alternatively,
will indicate that it is not appropriate.
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What are the dierences between software agents, e.g., in fields like MAS, economics, and social
simulation studies? Will social sciences help us building successful agent-based systems?
The range of core structures of agents is essentially independent of the application domain. As
argued above, there are dierences of granularity in some of these fields; the internal complexity of
agents in a multi-agent system may be much higher than that in a social simulation. On the other
hand, the types of interaction between agents may be much more varied in a social simulation than
they are in a multi-agent system—in the former, explicit communication may be supplemented by all
kinds of indirect communication via the state of, and changes in, the simulated society.
Economic models may have the least varied styles of interaction between agents since they usually
assume that most information is carried by global prices and their movements rather than by explicit
communication. Both agent systems and economic models may assume rational models of
agenthood; social simulations are less likely to do so. It should, however, be noted that in the case
of economic models, this depends upon whether the aim of the model is normative (to show how an
ideal market should work) or descriptive (to show how a real market does work).
Tennenholtz further suggests that experimental studies in the social sciences are crucial for some
of the work on agent technology such as electronic commerce, especially when there are human
users. In this case, experiments by cognitive psychologists and experimental economists in order to
test whether a protocol or algorithm is useful, can be vital. However, it seems at least as plausible to
ask whether computer modelling will help to build successful social theories as to ask whether social
science will help to build successful agent systems. Some expect the engineering (rather than
modelling) applications of multi-agent systems to continue to be the main driver of agent and multi-
agent theory over at least the next decade, but no discipline has a monopoly on either good or bad
ideas.
What are the general advantages and limitations of such attempts? How do you see the applicability
and limitations of the attempt to import models from other areas in your particular area of agent
research?
As far as social laws for robots are concerned, Tennenholtz agues that we are now in a situation
where we have extracted from the social world a design paradigm which, once formalised, becomes
almost a pure engineering task. On the other hand, work on protocols for non-cooperative agents
still requires eort to bridge the gap between computer science theories and economic theories—we
cannot bypass these gaps in a simple way. In general, these attempts are very useful; the transition
from logical theories to decision-theoretic models in mainstream artificial intelligence is one useful
example of this (which is not to say that it is a better approach, of course) that brings new ideas and
application. Such a transition could not happen if we had not tried to create these bridges between
theories in dierent areas.
Moss responds from a dierent perspective. Specifications of agents, their cognitive capacities
and the ways in which they interact are usefully informed by simulations conducted for social
science purposes. Moreover, the application of social simulation models to data mining, robotics
and process control provides a test of social theories and modelling procedures. Indeed, his own
experience suggests and his research programme is based upon the proposition that reasoning about
the transfer of agents from one discipline to others can usefully inform the receiving disciplines and
provide tests of the specifications of the originating disciplines.
Any discipline can get bogged down in its background assumptions—those ideas that are so
universally held that nobody is conscious of them any more. The advantage of inter-disciplinarity is
that dierent disciplines have dierent background assumptions, so that interaction can make
everyone more aware of what they are assuming.
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